Will The French Declare The “big Mac” A Mystery Too?

When Le Monde editorialized about George W. Bush’s legacy, predictably the newspaper described it as a complete disaster. For instance, “only a very few historians of the US presidency doubt that George Bush junior has been one of the most calamitous leaders the United States has had”.

Nothing very original here, but one passage is interesting:

“Commentators still wonder about [President Bush's] real motives for the invasion of Iraq. What part did his close circle play, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice? Must we blame [Bush's] desire to distinguish himself from a father who had refused, in 1991, to push to Baghdad? Is it this man’s propensity to Manichaeism, to divide the world  between Good and Evil, or his belief that his decisions, especially about Iraq, were dictated by God?”

Le Monde has the right to disapprove of the invasion of Iraq, but it must be one of the most abundantly documented political decisions in history. One could probably fill a super tanker with the literature produced on this subject, and I’m not sure it would still float. How and why these decisions were made is certainly a complex subject, but certainly not a mystery.

Still, the most prestigious French newspaper, read by every decision maker in the land, would not even consider as a theoretical possibility that some parts of the motivations articulated by the Bush administration could have been sincere or even worth mentioning. No, the real motives could only have reflected some kind of psychological disorder on the part of the President, or maybe his religious fanaticism – provided the decision was made by him and not by his “close circle”.

Still, things have changed a little lately. Six years ago, Le Monde would not have mentioned Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld or Condi Rice, but more likely Paul Wolfowitz and Doug Feith.

From a French point of view, Bush is before all the invader of Iraq. Why the French went so mad about this decision is the real mystery here. At the time, the French reaction not only disappointed American supporters of the operation, but also surprised them. Why did Chirac not just let the United States do what they had to do? Why did he actually try, or seem to try, to prevent the operation? And why did a poll made during the invasion seem to show that about a third of the French public actually wished for an American defeat?

The two questions are in fact one. Since Chirac decided – not before the end of December 2002 – that France would not be part of the coalition (its participation would have been symbolic anyway), the only way to gain something out of it was to oppose it vocally. Being neutral did not make much sense. Better to increase his domestic popularity by appearing as a world leader and designating the US as a kind of enemy (not a real one, since France no longer makes wars). Chirac did not remain popular very long. His party was crushed at the regional elections the following year. A lot of people generally despise him but still credit his opposition to the invasion of Iraq. As for the reasons behind the French public’s opposition to the invasion, that is a more complicated story, but in a word, when the media, the conservative government, the left-wing opposition parties, the far right and most public figures ask the public to support “peace” against “war”, that does not leave much room for suspense.

Bush probably could not do much to avoid becoming a punching bag in France. He probably did not care much and he was probably right. The real business going on between the two countries was not interrupted by the shouting and things are better now anyway. After all, it is not like France had really no part in the war on terror.