RSS Feed MenuProbably few Americans have heard of the case of General Paul Aussaresses, but it has troubled the peace of France for a decade. As Barack Obama rewrites the rules for America’s struggle against terrorism, the Aussaresses case reminds us that successful counter-insurgency is never easy and rarely clean.
Gen. Aussaresses served in the Free French special forces during WWII, then in Indochina and Algeria. In the Algerian war, Gen. Aussaresses played an important role as an intelligence officer–a role that involved torture to obtain information. Aussaresses also gave the order for at least two political assassinations, both of which were represented as suicides.
Aussaresses told his story in an interview with Le Monde in 2000, and then in his 2001 book Services Spéciaux Algérie 1955-1957. (Translated into English as The Battle of the Casbah). The Aussaresses statements provoked intense controversy both because of his own lack of regret for what he had done, and also because he implicated France’s political leadership in the decisions–including then-justice minister and future French president, Francois Mitterand.
President Jacques Chirac stripped Gen. Aussaresses of his Légion d’honneur.
A court fined him 7,500 Euros for condoning war crimes–an act that is a legal offense in France. Aussaresses’ two publishers were fined 15,000 Euros each. The latter verdict was sustained on appeal by France’s highest courts.
But one week ago, on January 15, the European court of human rights cancelled the publishers’ condemnation (Orban et autres contre France, requête no 20985/05). The ECHR verdict was based on Article 10 of the European declaration of human rights, related to freedom of speech.
Gen. Aussaresses spoke out mainly because he wanted to tell his own story. Yet his case also raises some hard and important questions of global relevance.
While Aussaresses has been disgraced, his contemporary David Galula has become famous thanks to the attention paid him by America’s Gen. Petraeus. Galula was a French officer, expelled from the Army as part of the Vichy regime’s purge of Jews, who also served with the Free French and also saw action in Algeria. In Algeria, Galula developed an ambitious theory of counterinsurgency that stressed gaining the support of the population–a seemingly soft alternative to the methods used by Aussaresses.
Galula’s own experience, in the area of Tizi-Ouzou, was apparently a successful one, and Petraeus drew many lessons from it for his own counter-insurgency manual, now the basis for US counter-insurgency operations.
So we have an attractive morality tale: Hard methods fail; soft methods work.
But is it so really so easy?
My father, who served in the same sector some months before Galula, reminded me that before Galula could win over the population in his sector, counter-insurgent forces had to kill a lot of FLN operatives. To do that, they had to use more classical, and brutal, methods. In Algeria, the bulk of the FLN was destroyed through the “plan Challe” (Challe was the general in charge of the operations in Algeria from December 1958 to January 1961, before taking part in the failed coup in April 1961). The Challe plan simply consisted in destroying FLN units sector by sector with elite regiments (paratroopers and legion) and then transferring pacified sectors to mainstream army units while sealing the Tunisian border with the “Morice line”, a defensive fence heavily surveyed and defended. Only then could the “non-kinetic” counter-insurgency work begin. People like Aussaresses, Massu or Bigeard had to come first in order for the “population security” techniques advocated by Galula to succeed.
What made Algeria a particularly problematic period in recent French history was in large part the fact that the war was won and lost at the same time. It was won in military terms, the FLN having been mainly destroyed, but it was lost politically because French war aims were incoherent from the start. Winning the war meant keeping Algeria as part of France. That would have been a disaster, and as that fact dawned on the French, the governments decided to quit despite the military success.
France’s withdrawal from Algeria unleashed some ugly political consequences–consequences that are still felt today. Defeat can bring long-term political problems which a victory can spare.
Having said that, the Galula method seems to have worked well in Iraq, at least well enough to prevent a defeat, but two questions may have to be asked:
1. How important have the pre-surge operations been in the current, apparently positive, outcome?
2. Can defeat be avoided the same way in Afghanistan, a bigger country with a larger population where the US/allied contingent is far less important than it has been in Iraq and where, for that reason, “classical” or “kinetic” war has not really been an option the way it has been in Algeria and Iraq?
The answer is certainly far from obvious, but it is probably wise to keep in mind that Afghanistan is not Iraq, and that the Galula model is not a magic solution. It is always a good idea to read Galula, but thanks are due the European Court of Human Rights for allowing us to read Aussaresses without penalty.
senorlechero // Jan 25, 2009 at 10:30 pm
Great Post! Well Done. I would like to comment on your question #1. Pre surge operations were very important to the success of the surge. Operations Phantom Fury and Steel Curtain showed Iraqis that we were fully able to defeat al Qaeda in area by area combat. After Steel Curtain the US Marines secured Husaybah and did not allow al Qaeda to return in numbers sufficient to wreak havoc. That showed the Sunni tribes that the US would protect them and would only kill insurgents trying to kill them. The tribes were tired of being killed by both al Qaeda and the US, and chose to side with the US. Thus was born the Anbar Awakening, and the “Surge” was born.
senorlechero // Jan 25, 2009 at 10:36 pm
I’d also like to put my 2cents worth in on #2. It’s not clear that the Surge strategy will work in Afghanistan. It’s not clear that we can put enough military members into the troubled areas to beat the Taliban and secure the population. It’s certainly possible, but will be a logistical nightmare. The forces it will take to do this are the Marine Expeditionary Units and Special Operations branches of the Army, Navy and Marines. There are not enough of these units to do the job at this time. And even if Patraeus believes there are, keeping such units supplied will be extremely difficult, nearly impossible. So where does that leave us? If I were Obama I would “seal off” the trouble areas, gradually increase special units in the trouble areas, and secure them one area at a time.
suey // Jan 26, 2009 at 5:50 am
Bush bribed the tribal leaders with money. Billions of dollars have been spent in “protection” money in Iraq. Bush and conservatives in general are ignorant of history and never learn either by their own mistakes or the errors of others. Take a look at the way the Brits finally solved the IRA problem. Locking terrorists away without trial led to an explosion of new terrorists and money to buy new weapons. Invading a whole country to kill a small band of terrorists was dumb. It required a smart approach using surgical strikes. Why have special forces if you don’t use them for this sort of mission. Real Nation building and not occupation is the key to solving the problem. Bombing countries back into the dark ages just spawns more and more terrorists. Think how you would react if China decided on “regime change” in the USA, bombed our cities and successfully invaded our country. would you fight back as they tried to lock you away for defending your country? Don’t always assume that our version of democracy fits all nations, it does NOT. Often a dictatorship is the way to keep a country of different tribes together. What have we achieved in The Middle East? A stronger Iran, more terrorists than there were before, our economy ruined and our reputation in the world diminished. Way to go Bush/GOP.
DougD // Jan 26, 2009 at 8:20 am
Fascinating post, Jean.
Personally, I am terrified that we are already blundering in Afghanistan; already fighting the last war. Iraq and Afghanistan simply couldn’t be more different.
Afghanistan is a narco-state, if it can even be called a state. It is tribal, weak, lacking in education, infrastructure and any kind of culture that would lend itself to modern economic or political activity.
Iraq is reasonably well educated, has significant natural resources, a long and (mostly) sophisticated cultural history. In short, there are good strategic reasons for seeding a democracy in Iraq, and, post Patreus, some reason for guarded optimism that the seed will take.
Afghanistan, not so much. I see no hope for nation-building. I see no hope for drug eradication, and I see no hope for democracy. I wish it were otherwise, but all I’m thinking is hit and run – i.e. incent the drug lords to work with us to root out and kill jihadists and leave it at that.
Obama’s thinking on Afghanistan / Iraq is his first strategic blunder, and a first (and very depressing) indication of his inexperience.
suey // Jan 26, 2009 at 9:27 am
Doug D, well Bush did a fine job with all his experience! NOT. We need to get our bulk forces out of the Middle East. It is not possible to win a un conventional fight with conventional tactics ( Ask the Russians w that went) We need to use the tactics of the enemy to defeat the enemy. Use our special forces and intelligence services ANYWHERE in the world to defeat Al qaeda. At the same time we need to use what is left of our goodwill and overseas budget to support nation building in the Palestinian territories and elsewhere where we have created slums and refugees. Hearts and minds.
ericna // Jan 26, 2009 at 9:27 am
On a historical note, it may be observed that the successful British counterinsurgency in Malaysia was run along the same lines. Trying to win against an insurgency by beating them to smithereens rarely work and these days you also have to pay for the bad PR it generates.
senorlechero // Jan 26, 2009 at 10:39 am
uming that Obama successfully follows up on the Bush success in Iraq, the war in Iraq will go down in history as one of the greatest victories in anti-insurgent warfare. The insurgency really got going in late ‘03. Victory was withing grasp in early ‘07. By early ‘08 it was clear we were winning. That’s 4 1/2 years of hard fought anti insurgency warfare ending in victory. That is very good historically speaking
sinz54 // Jan 26, 2009 at 10:42 am
Senorlechero: In his speech to the nation in January 2007, Bush himself admitted that the military strategy employed till then had failed. Victory was NOT within grasp; Bush said we were on the verge of disaster if a major course correction did not take place. That’s why he reversed course and ordered the surge. So go argue with him.
suey // Jan 26, 2009 at 10:45 am
We “Bought” the end of the insurgency with dollars, lots of dollars plane loads of dollars shipped on pallets. We bribed the tribal leaders with this money. The Iranians to Sadr to stop fighting as they want the US out of the region. W handed the Middle east to the Iranians on a plate. Great strategy. Any spelling mistakes are this site dropping characters and not idleness on my part!
sinz54 // Jan 26, 2009 at 10:53 am
Actually, I think Afghanistan will prove easier than Iraq. Because Afghanistan is not only a country but a nation; its people think of themselves as Afghans. Whereas Iraq was never a nation. It was cobbled together by European colonialists from disparate peoples: Part of Kurdistan (the rest was ceded to Turkey as spoils of the Turkey-Greece War of 1920); the Sunnis; and the Shiites. Historically, these sects haven’t gotten along with each other. That made it real easy for al-Qaeda to play divide and conquer, by blowing up some mosques and waiting for that sect to blame other sects and take revenge. We don’t have sectarian problems as bad as tse in Afghanistan. Besides, the Iraq War drew in the riff-raff of all the surrounding countries; jihadists were streaming in from Iran, from Saudi Arabia, and even from Syria. With Afghanistan, the only neighbor which is likely to play that game with gusto is stan. And President Obama has said he’ll take a strong stand with stan against terrorism.
sinz54 // Jan 26, 2009 at 10:55 am
Yes, suey: What is this glitch about dropping characters? Also this site won’t take comments beyond a certain length. We suld have a discussion about debugging this website. Also I wish we could insert paragraph breaks (blank lines) into comments.
suey // Jan 26, 2009 at 11:06 am
Sinz yep the site is a mess. What’s with the latest comments appearing at the top instead of the bottom? Makes the thread very difficult to follow. They need Obama’s site designers here for sure.
senorlechero // Jan 26, 2009 at 12:06 pm
sinz…you obviously don’t know the history. In early 07 General Patreaus proposed the Surge strategy. He saw the theater prepared for victory and proposed w it could be achieved. Bush did it, and it worked. w is that not “within grasp”? I reckon it could be if one uses the “that depends on what the definition of is is” metd of looking at facts.
senorlechero // Jan 26, 2009 at 12:22 pm
sinz…The people of Afghanistan do not see themselves “as Afghans”. They are 80% tribal and do not care one iota for the regional govt. You are correct that there is not ’sectarian” differences like in Iraq, but there are mive tribal differences, and the tribes do not relate to the secular govt.
sinz54 // Jan 26, 2009 at 5:34 pm
SenorLechero: Actually, I do know the history of it. In the fall of 2006, the Iraq Study Group (ISG) was getting ready to release their report. It would call for a gradual downsizing of the American military effort, combined with diplomatic initiatives toward Syria and Iran. And there began to be significant political pressure on Bush to accept the ISG’s recommendations. To head this off, William Kristol and Robert Kagan of the neoconservative magazine “The Weekly Standard” quickly wrote a counter-proposal for a “surge” of U.S. forces in Iraq. I read the proposal. It was written hurriedly in December in the space of a few weeks, and it looked like it. Nevertheless, Bush liked what he read–and he announced such a surge the following month, January 2007. As you can see from this column in September 2006 by Kristol about a proposed surge (http://tinyurl.com/aztx8n), Petraeus is not mentioned–because it wasn’t his idea. It was the idea of the neoconservatives, and they succeeded in getting Bush to adopt it instead of the ISG report’s recommendations. Notice too, that these conservatives admitted that the situation in Iraq was sliding out of control at that time.