Via an interesting post by Chris Conover, I came across this recently released National Health Expenditure report, which has data on health-care spending up through 2009.  This data includes a state-by-state breakdown of personal health-care spending (a number that includes direct expenditures on health-care but does not include administrative costs).

Digging into these numbers allows one to calculate (roughly) the growth of health-care spending in each state from 1991 to 2007.  This data set tells an interesting story for Massachusetts after the passage of health-care reform there: after the passage of Romney’s reforms, the rate of per capita health-care spending growth slowed in Massachusetts both in absolute terms and relative to the national average.

Here’s a chart I put together looking at the cumulative growth over two periods: from 2004 to 2006 (prior to Romneycare) and from 2007 to 2009 (after the measure was applied).  I’ve included the US national average as a whole as well as the New England average in order to situate Massachusetts in its local context.  New Hampshire offers the example of a New England state which did not engage in Romney-style reforms, and Ohio offers a counterexample of a Midwestern state with relatively slower-growing health-care costs.  Texas, often touted as an alternative model for the nation, also helpfully sets up a contrast with Massachusetts.  This chart looks at the cumulative percentage change in per capita personal health-care spending over the 2004-2006 and 2007-2009 periods.

Perhaps in part due to the recession, the rate of growth for health-care spending dropped for the nation as a whole (though spending did still grow).  However, it’s worth noting that, in the years after Romney’s reforms went into effect, the rate of growth for health-care spending in Massachusetts dropped even faster than the national average did.  Between 2004 and 2006, health-care spending in Massachusetts grew almost 27% faster than it did for the nation as a whole; between 2007 and 2009, it grew only 5% faster.  After Romney’s reforms, Massachusetts went from having a health-care spending growth rate well above the national average to one just a little bit above.  For example, between 2008 and 2009, personal health-care spending increased at a rate of 3.8% in the US, while Massachusetts saw its spending increase by 3.9%.  Compare that to the changes between 2005 and 2006: US spending grew at 5.3%, but Massachusetts spending grew at 7.6%.  Situating Massachusetts in the context of the rest of New England makes the change in spending rates even starker: prior to Romney’s reforms, Massachusetts personal health-care spending grew faster than the New England average most years.  After his reforms, it grew slower than the New England average (often having one of the lowest rates of health-care spending growth in the region).  These numbers suggest that Texas is doing a worse job at taming the rate of health-care spending growth than Massachusetts (though, for the moment, per capita health-care spending in Texas is lower than that of Massachusetts).

Massachusetts seems to have especially slowed down the rate of growth in hospital spending.  Between 2004 and 2006, Massachusetts hospital spending jumped 16.5%; between 2007 and 2009, it only climbed 5.5% (a 67% reduction in the rate of growth).  US spending on hospital care grew 12.7% between 2004 and 2006; between 2007 and 2009, it grew 8.6% (a 33% reduction in the rate of growth).  Spending in Massachusetts hospitals rose much more slowly than the national average.  One of the key premises of Romneycare was that bringing all of the commonwealth into the health-care system would lower the need of hospital use (especially the use of emergency room care) and thereby lower spending at the hospital level.  These numbers seem to suggest that something like that may be happening.

In many areas of health-care spending, the rate of growth for spending in Massachusetts either fell more than it did for the nation as a whole or fell at roughly the same rate.  This data would seem to muddy the waters for the claim that Romney’s reforms caused health-care spending in Massachusetts to skyrocket.  Since Romneycare, health-care spending in Massachusetts (at least until 2009) grew more slowly than it did in many other states and also grew much more slowly compared to the rate of spending growth in Massachusetts before Romneycare took effect.

Health-care spending depends upon a variety of factors (including population aging and economic growth), so this data set does not tell the whole story regarding the effect of the 2006 reforms on health-care spending.  It does, however, pose a challenge to the argument that Romney’s reforms uniquely inflated health-care spending in Massachusetts.  In terms of raw health-care spending, Massachusetts seems to have bent slightly down the curve of growth—compared to many other states and, in many respects, the nation as a whole.

(Of course, the rate of growth in health-care spending is not the sole deciding issue for Romneycare: other questions about long-term sustainability, the role of government coercion and spending, and other topics are also very important.  Nor is there a direct correlation between health-care spending and private insurance premiums, which seem to have increased in recent years.  Moreover, data for years after 2009 might tell a more complicated story.)

Originally Posted at A Certain Enthusiasm.

In the wake of the Iowa caucuses, what matters now is not the exact order of Romney, Santorum, and Paul; the numbers are very close. What does matter is the range between the candidates. Iowa gives us basically a tie between Romney and Santorum, with both at around 25%. Ron Paul comes out a strong third at around 21%. Gingrich, Perry, Bachmann, and Huntsman, who did not even campaign in Iowa, fall far behind.

Romney did not sew up the nomination tonight, but he took a significant step down the road to the nomination. A few months ago, Romney was polling in the high teens and low twenties in Iowa. Since July, he has had relatively few days where he was in the lead. So a tie today is a not-insignificant accomplishment. It is, however, a limited one: he still remains under 26%. A big win in New Hampshire would be helpful for Romney in breaking the Romney-ceiling narrative. And Romney’s people shouldn’t be too depressed about the fact that Romney performed at about the same level in 2008 in Iowa: Reagan lost the Iowa caucuses to Ford in 1976 and lost them again to George HW Bush in 1980—he couldn’t get above 30% in 1980. Somehow, Reagan still won the nomination, and the presidency, in 1980.

This is a hard night for Rick Perry. He spent more than any other candidate in Iowa and is stuck in fifth place. With Perry’s declaration that he is going back to Texas to re-access his path to the nomination, his campaign is in critical condition. Newt Gingrich can’t be too happy, either. A few weeks after boasting that he would be the nominee, he is stuck with a disappointing fourth-place showing. Moreover, the path to the nomination for Michele Bachmann now seems almost totally closed down.

Independents were responsible for Ron Paul’s performance tonight. Among Republicans, the entrance poll reports the following: 28% Santorum, 27% Romney, and 14% Paul. Among independents, however, the numbers were 44% Paul, 18% Romney, and 13% Santorum. The “independent” number shows a big increase from the 2008 Republican caucuses; with the Democratic caucuses uncontested this year, many Democratic-leaners may have come out for Paul. Due to a number of reasons, it seems quite clear that many Democrats would love to run against Paul.

And, of course, this was a very good night for Rick Santorum. The outstanding question is whether Iowa is a one-off or a route to the nomination. For George W. Bush, it was the latter. For Mike Huckabee, it was the former. Look to see whether Rick Santorum’s numbers rise in national polling over the next few days. If they do, those looking for a not-Romney might rally around him.

Santorum has wisely decided to contest the New Hampshire primary. Expanding his brand there will be crucial for maintaining his momentum. There’s a reason why many Perry supporters and Gingrich supporters are deriding Santorum’s chances of getting the nomination: he’s a serious threat to them. If momentum starts to accrue to Santorum, we might see Gingrich and, possibly, Perry focus their fire on him rather than on Romney. We might also see Gingrich choose instead to focus on tearing down Romney in order to keep him from getting the nomination—whether that leads to a Gingrich victory or not. Santorum’s victory speech tonight presents a less angry Santorum, one focusing on economic growth and social optimism. Like Romney, he has won in Democratic-leaning areas before.

A few points about the future:

The January 10 New Hampshire Primary: Look at Santorum’s and Huntsman’s performances. A decent showing in New Hampshire can keep Santorum nationally viable. Huntsman needs a strong showing to keep his campaign vital.

The January 21 South Carolina Primary: This could be a bloody, bloody battlefield. It’s hard to see how both Gingrich and Perry make it out of this primary, if they both make it to that point. Perry is especially vulnerable here; Gingrich could have strong, though not winning, numbers and still limp on to Florida. A Romney win here would almost guarantee him the nomination, though he in no way needs to win in order to maintain his leading status. Santorum’s numbers will also bear watching.

Originally Posted at A Certain Enthusiasm.

The Republican Party of Virginia is on the verge of the appearance of a significant scandal. Allegations, fueled by a post by Richard Winger at Ballot Access News, are swirling, suggesting that the Virginia GOP changed the rules for the validation of signatures in October 2011:

But what has not been reported is that in the only other presidential primaries in which Virginia required 10,000 signatures (2000, 2004, and 2008) the signatures were not checked. Any candidate who submitted at least 10,000 raw signatures was put on the ballot. In 2000, five Republicans qualified: George Bush, John McCain, Alan Keyes, Gary Bauer, and Steve Forbes. In 2004 there was no Republican primary in Virginia. In 2008, seven Republicans qualified: John McCain, Mike Huckabee, Mitt Romney, Ron Paul, Rudy Giuliani, Fred Thompson, and Alan Keyes [Not actually on the 2008 ballot--FB].

The only reason the Virginia Republican Party checked the signatures for validity for the current primary is that in October 2011, an independent candidate for the legislature, Michael Osborne, sued the Virginia Republican Party because it did not check petitions for its own members, when they submitted primary petitions. Osborne had no trouble getting the needed 125 valid signatures for his own independent candidacy, but he charged that his Republican opponent’s primary petition had never been checked, and that if it had been, that opponent would not have qualified. The lawsuit, Osborne v Boyles, cl 11-520-00, was filed in Bristol County Circuit Court. It was filed too late to be heard before the election, but is still pending. The effect of the lawsuit was to persuade the Republican Party to start checking petitions. If the Republican Party had not changed that policy, Newt Gingrich and Rick Perry would be on the 2012 ballot.

Obviously, sudden changes in standards for petitions to get on the ballot can raise a lot of questions.

However, in the 2008 presidential cycle, none other than Erick Erickson was actually complaining about the GOP checking the signatures on the petitions of presidential candidates:

Romney, Fred, Rudy, McCain, Huckabee, and Paul all filed over 15,000 signatures each – well above the recommended minimums.

So what did the Virginia GOP do? Well, they did absolutely nothing to help any of the candidates other than put out clipboards at their state fair booth.

Then they decided to attempt some kind of unprecedented “verification” process. Historically, forms have never been checked by either party, often they never even open the boxes. They gave no one notice of this new process. They sent all the campaigns an email notice the Friday afternoon after they’d all filed their signatures. You can see the memo below. As you can see its a ridiculous attempt to replicate Florida in 2000.

At the time, no one had any idea who the “verifiers” would be or who they supported. Likewise, everyone had questions on what did and did not constitute legitimate signatures. All the campaigns had to lawyer up against their own party. The Executive Director of the Virginia GOP had the nerve to pace the room, during the verification process, in a referee jersey. Likewise, the process for verification changed throughout the day, despite the party sending out its guidelines ahead of time in writing.

So there may have been some verification in the 2008 cycle after all.

Moreover, Richard Winger, in an email to me, admits that the signatures were put through some verification process in 2007. The 2007 checking was “to see how many signatures there were from each U.S. House district, and also how many there were statewide.” Winger also believes that the signatures were checked to see if they were notarized (a key requirement for Virginia). He says that signatures were not cross-checked with voter registration forms to ensure that petition signers actually lived in their stated addresses. (I have reached out to VA GOP officials involved in the 2007 count but have not yet heard back from any.)

So there are a few outstanding facts here:

• You need 10,000 verified signatures (with at least 400 signatures from each Congressional District) in order to get on the Virginia Republican primary ballot. These signatures must be notarized. This requirement has been in place for over a decade.
• In 2007, most of the major GOP candidates submitted over 15,000 signatures and were on the ballot.
• In 2011, Mitt Romney submitted more than 15,000 signatures and is on the ballot.
• Ron Paul submitted around 15,000 signatures and is on the ballot.
• Newt Gingrich and Rick Perry submitted under 12,000 signatures each (fewer than the major candidates of 2008), but were disqualified.

On the last point, the main question is why?

This is where the Republican Party of Virginia can come in and save its reputation.

If Gingrich or Perry were disqualified because they did not get 400 signatures from each Congressional District, it would seem as though the enforcement regime has not materially changed in the past few months (since the same standard was used in 2008).

If Gingrich or Perry were disqualified because enough signatures were not notarized, it would seem as though the enforcement regime has not materially changed in the past few months (since the same standard was used in 2008).

Under either circumstance, there would seem insufficient evidence to claim that any “dirty tricks” occurred.

However, there are plenty of permutations under which “dirty tricks” could have occurred. Only further information can help us sort this out.

Unless there is some legal limitation, it is imperative for the Virginia GOP to make clear exactly why Gingrich and Perry were disqualified. If it can be clearly established that Gingrich’s and Perry’s campaigns did not follow long-standing rules, then it seems hard (if not impossible) to claim a pro-Romney conspiracy. It seems clear the Gingrich campaign was not particularly familiar with the rules of the Virginia primary, as Gingrich’s declaration that he would run as a write-in demonstrates; write-in candidacies are not allowed in the Virginia GOP primary. Moreover, I have seen a few reports suggesting that some of Perry’s signatures were not properly notarized. So it’s possible that they ran afoul of the rules due not to a sinister conspiracy but due to sloppiness. But I don’t know, and neither do those alleging a conspiracy.

Instead of rumors, we need facts. Instead of spin, we need information.

(NB: None of this is an endorsement of the rules Virginia puts in place for getting on the primary ballot. Also, all this is very contingent on information as it comes in.)

(There is an electoral side to this as well. One might tip one’s hat at the success of the Perrysphere and Gingrichsphere in shifting the conversation away from the fact that neither campaign could manage to get enough signatures in a significant Super Tuesday state to avoid this debacle—that Fred Thompson’s campaign (an operation not noted for its efficiency) outmatched both Gingrich’s and Perry’s teams. Instead of a narrative of organizational incompetence, they have put forward one of conspiratorial victimization. Whether or not the Virginia GOP is engaged in “dirty tricks,” it’s quite clear that Barack Obama’s team in 2012 will pull no procedural punches. A Republican candidate ill-equipped to fight back on the procedural level is not very likely to sit in the Oval Office.)

Originally Posted at A Certain Enthusiasm.

Ronald Reagan’s speech at the 1980 Republican National Convention provides a welcome jolt amidst the atmosphere of the current Republican nominating contest. Instead of hypocritical invective and mindless tribalism, Reagan offers a fundamentally optimistic and cooperative narrative of America.

Though this speech has moments of anger, it is not, at heart, an angry speech. Consider some of these lines near the opening:

I know we have had a quarrel or two, but only as to the method of attaining a goal. There was no argument about the goal. As president, I will establish a liaison with the 50 governors to encourage them to eliminate, where it exists, discrimination against women. I will monitor federal laws to insure their implementation and to add statutes if they are needed.

More than anything else, I want my candidacy to unify our country; to renew the American spirit and sense of purpose. I want to carry our message to every American, regardless of party affiliation, who is a member of this community of shared values.

Not a single word about destroying those rotten, freedom-hating “progressives” or “liberals.” Not even an invocation of “union thugs”! Instead, we see a defense of anti-discrimination laws and an advocacy for the broader purpose of bringing the country together. Rather than inveighing against enemies, Reagan reaches out to potential allies.

Though Reagan criticizes Carter throughout this speech, his criticism seems to emphasize Carter’s incompetence and unfitness for the task of government. He does not claim that Carter hates freedom or despises capitalism or has bad intentions for the country.

A politician today might be denounced by certain factions as a “statist” or “collectivist” for repeating these lines by Reagan:

Isn’t it once again time to renew our compact of freedom; to pledge to each other all that is best in our lives; all that gives meaning to them–for the sake of this, our beloved and blessed land?

Together, let us make this a new beginning. Let us make a commitment to care for the needy; to teach our children the values and the virtues handed down to us by our families; to have the courage to defend those values and the willingness to sacrifice for them.

Let us pledge to restore, in our time, the American spirit of voluntary service, of cooperation, of private and community initiative; a spirit that flows like a deep and mighty river through the history of our nation.

Reagan here seems to suggest that the needy should not be blamed for their poverty but helped from it. Praising “private and community” initiatives is not necessarily elevating government actions, but it does dismiss the celebration of selfishness. From this Reaganite perspective, liberty is more than the celebration of private profit; it is also the opportunity to do public good, beyond the scope of the business ledger.

Reagan goes on to embrace RINO apostasy in his defense of the social safety net and Social Security:

It is essential that we maintain both the forward momentum of economic growth and the strength of the safety net beneath those in society who need help. We also believe it is essential that the integrity of all aspects of Social Security are preserved.

This isn’t winner-take-all crony capitalism. This is instead a faith in the growth of markets complemented by a compassion for human need.

In this speech, Reagan is a defender of small-government thinking. And he does make a compelling case for it, but this case does not depend upon demonizing his opponents. Reagan knew that venom was the common friend of failure. Instead, a spirit of optimistic faith in the potential of liberty motivates this address.

Reagan speaks from a time when conservatism meant more than having the right enemies, when it offered a vision of bringing together Americans in the dream of a greater freedom. This dream does not merely entail getting rich but also emphasizes building, by oneself and in cooperation with others, a fairer, juster, and happier society.

2012 could be a great opportunity for conservative and Republican politics. If they are to make the most of it, Republicans should keep in mind that Reaganite spirit of hope over despair, unity over division, and empathy over scorn. It’s easy in a time of trials to settle into a complacent alienation. But, for the sake of this American republic, it is even more necessary as a matter of civic spirit to work to renew the civic compact and face our problems with temperance, reason, and, yes, some measure of good cheer.

Originally Posted at A Certain Enthusiasm.

Some on the right are concerned that Obama would slam Romney as a denizen of Wall Street and that Romney’s wealth would prove a hindrance in the general election. While some worries about Romney’s business background are more the product of sympathy for other candidates than anything else, there is an element of real anxiety to them, and they are not completely baseless.

However, there are numerous reasons not to overestimate the potential effectiveness of White House attacks on Romney over Wall Street connections.

Perhaps foremost among them is the White House’s own very deep connections to Wall Street. Cabinet figures like Tim Geithner and White House allies like Jon Corzine are the embodiment of Wall Street insiders—they make Mitt Romney look like a secretary at the Merrill Lynch branch office in Fargo, North Dakota. Many of Obama’s top advisors come from the world of Wall Street. Any attacks on Romney’s Street connections immediately open Obama up to the countercharge of hypocrisy: if Wall Street is so bad, why do you choose to people your administration with Streeters and have Wall Street tycoons as central fund-raisers for your presidential campaign?

Charges of hypocrisy here could be particularly damaging for Obama. Despite a lackluster (to put it mildly) administration, Obama still has a chance of winning reelection in part because of the personal affection that many Americans still have for him. The glow of Obama as a political figure who can rise above petty partisan squabbles has dimmed, but it has not entirely vanished. If Obama becomes painted as just another hypocritical political opportunist, his reelection prospects suffer a considerable blow.

Moreover, attacks upon Romney’s wealth would make Obama seem more like Walter Mondale than Bill Clinton. Invective-fueled class warfare might be helpful at the margins, but America is still, despite a decade of trials, an optimistic nation. It would seem out of touch indeed for Obama, not exactly a poor man himself, to be complaining about Romney’s wealth when millions of Americans are out of work. The American public would much rather see solutions for the nation’s problems instead of complaints about an individual’s success.

This suggests another limitation for Obama’s potential attacks upon Romney’s corporate history. It’s true that a number of people were laid off due to the actions of Bain Capital (though many others were also hired due to Bain). The media (and maybe some Republican candidates) will be sure to emphasize the lost jobs and displaced individuals. But millions more have lost their jobs in Obama’s economy. The disappointments of the stimulus bill far exceed those of Bain. A comparison of Romney’s employment record in the corporate world and as governor of Massachusetts with Obama’s is not one that would seem to be in the president’s favor at the moment. The president’s only hope for reelection is to focus on the future; looking to the past will only emphasize the shortcomings of the administration. Obama may think that his administration’s accomplishments may possibly exceed those of Lincoln, but most Americans are a little more pessimistic on that point.

Some rightie activists have suggested that Ted Kennedy’s anti-Romney strategy in 1994 offers a devastating blueprint for Obama’s 2012 strategy against Romney. This parallel should also not be overstated. Kennedy did hit Romney hard on his record at Bain, but Barack Obama is no Ted Kennedy, and the United States is not Massachusetts. Kennedy’s 17-point victory over Romney was a decisive one, but 1994 was the only time Kennedy’s reelection margin fell below 20 points. Even with all his Wall Street attacks, Kennedy’s margin of victory was over 10 points less than it was in 1988 or 2000. Obama lacks Kennedy’s electoral cushion; a 10-point swing would end his presidency.

Moreover, in 2002, Shannon O’Brien, the Democratic nominee for Massachusetts governor, tried replicate Kennedy’s tactics, but she was not able to copy his success. A close race with a slim Democratic lead according to most polls ended in a 5-point victory for Romney. It would seem likely that such attacks will be even less effective now.

There are obviously topics in Romney’s business background that should be investigated more. But Romney also has a number of years of government and public service upon which to run. Obama may hope that class warfare can distract from the nation’s poor economic picture, but there is no reason why Republicans should allow that triumph of rhetoric over reality.

Originally Posted at A Certain Enthusiasm

Though Newt Gingrich seems to be styling himself as the inevitable nominee, a look back at the polling in during the Republican primary race in late 2007 suggests that Gingrich’s camp should not get too confident yet.

In December 2007, no polls seemed to show McCain as the frontrunner. Instead, Giuliani and a fast-rising Mike Huckabee tended to dominate in polling.

A CNN poll released December 10 showed McCain at 13%, while Giuliani and Huckabee were at 24% and 22%, respectively.

A CBS poll released that same day had even worse news for McCain: 7% of the nationwide Republican primary vote. Meanwhile, Giuliani and Huckabee were cruising at 22% and 21%, respectively.

The Florida primary was a huge step for McCain toward the Republican nomination, but, in early December 2007, he was an also-ran. Polls showed him between twenty and thirty points behind frontrunner Giuliani. As December went on, Huckabee climbed, but McCain remained mired in the low teens.

The dynamic of this cycle has differed from the 2007-2008 primary race in a lot of ways, so this isn’t exactly an apples-to-apples comparison. But the fact remains that neither Mike Huckabee nor Rudy Giuliani made it on to the 2008 GOP ticket. The history of presidential politics is filled with candidates who presumed to inevitability after a surge in the polls only to find themselves not quite so inevitable after all (just ask Rick Perry, who seemed on the verge of having a lock on the nomination in the early fall). The GOP primary race is still very much alive.

Originally Posted at A Certain Enthusiasm.

In an interview with Laura Ingraham, George Will despairs of the choice between Gingrich and Romney as GOP frontrunners:

Ask yourself this: Suppose Gingrich or Romney become president and gets re-elected – suppose you had eight years of this…What would the conservative movement be? How would it understand itself after eight years? I think what would have gone away, perhaps forever, is the sense of limited government, the Tenth Amendment, Madisonian government of limited, delegated and enumerated powers — the sense conservatism is indeed tied to limitations on federal authority and the police power wielded by Congress — that would all be gone. It’s hard to know what would be left.

In a column, Will doubles down on this line of criticism.

Will is no fan of Romney, but he is an even bigger opponent of Gingrich, whom he calls the least conservative candidate. Instead, Will suggests Rick Perry and Jon Huntsman (whom more and more pundits have been giving a second look) as “conservative” alternatives.

I’m not sure that Will’s despair here is entirely justified, however. After all, look at some of the salient points of George W. Bush’s domestic record:

• Tax-cuts that were not offset by spending decreases and thereby added to the deficit (It’s amusing to read a Heritage report from 2001 that predicted that the Bush tax-cuts would lead to the near-elimination of the federal debt by 2011).

• Exploding government spending.

• Anemic economic growth (well below the averages of past decades).

• Enormous deficit spending.

• No Child Left Behind, which sets the stage for the federalization of public education and was probably the greatest expansion of federal power over education that the nation has ever seen.

• Sundry other expansions of federal power, including the ban on the traditional tungsten incandescent bulb, which currently has conservatives up in arms.

• A housing bubble (which the administration’s policies encouraged).

• A near-economic meltdown.

This list is partial, and doesn’t consider the cases of the almosts that the Bush administration fought hard for but failed to achieve (such as Justice Harriet Miers). Bush’s whole “compassionate conservatism” was premised on expanding federal power in order to achieve certain “compassionate” ends.

Somehow, small-government conservatism survived President Bush, and I see no reason why it could not survive some of the GOP presidential contenders, some of whom have a far more conservative campaign theme than Bush ever did. For example, though Will derides Romney as a “manager” or something, Romney’s proposed policies would seem to have no small potential for promoting the aims of small-government conservatism.

To return to Will’s column attacking Gingrinch for a moment, there’s another point I’d like to look at:

Romney’s main objection to contemporary Washington seems to be that he is not administering it. God has 10 commandments, Woodrow Wilson had 14 points, Heinz had 57 varieties, but Romney’s economic platform has 59 planks — 56 more than necessary if you have low taxes, free trade and fewer regulatory burdens.

I think this formulation is a little glib. Consider “fewer regulatory burdens.” The fact is that we currently live amidst a complex of regulations. Every regulation depends upon every other regulation (as traditional conservatism would recognize). So it’s not enough to get rid of regulatory burdens but to revise these burdens in the right way. Under Bush, certain regulations were gotten rid of, but the intersection of this “deregulation” and other regulations that were kept in place brought American to the brink of a financial collapse. Will may sneer at technocratic tendencies, but skill in finessing current regulatory regimes would be no small aid to small-government policies.

Originally Posted at A Certain Enthusiasm.

Though Rick Perry’s plan to “reform” Washington has been getting a lot of press, I think there is something that should especially be emphasized about it, one that does not bode well for classical conservatism: Perry’s plan seems a recipe for radically increasing the power of the executive branch.

Here are some of the principles:

• Ending the practice of giving lifetime appointments to federal judges (current judges would not be affected);
• Cutting Congressional pay in half;
• Cutting Congressional pay in half again if they don’t balance the budget by 2020;
• Cutting Congressional office budgets in half;
• Cutting the Congressional calendar by half;
• Criminalizing insider trading by Congressmen;
• Reducing spending to 18% of GDP;
• Privatizing Fannie & Freddie;
• Ending the funding of Planned Parenthood;
• Eliminating the Commerce, Education, and Energy Departments;
• Getting the EPA under control;
• Getting the TSA under control;
• Audit the government, including the Department of Defense;
• Freeze incoming federal regulations, and audit all of them for the last five years;
• Federal salary freeze for all non-military and non-law enforcement officials until the budget is balanced;
• And cutting the Presidential salary in half until the budget is balanced

There’s a lot here—some of it good, some of it not so good. Let’s focus on Congress for the moment. One of the key levers of power for Roosevelt’s New Deal and, more broadly, the modern presidency is its corps of bureaucrats and analysts; the Executive Office alone has at least 2000 or so staffers. The president has access to layers and layers of information. This access gives the president great influence in shaping the annual budget and the details of policy. Members of Congress may propose laws, but the substance of these laws often has considerable White House backing.

Congressional staff provide at least a partial check on the data power of the executive branch. By undermining Congressional staffs through salary cuts, one also undermines the ability of Congress to shape the information narrative and write legislation. Meanwhile, cutting Congressional pay might seem an invitation to more petty corruption.

One can say this about Rick Perry with some confidence: he knows how power works. As Governor of Texas, he has shown considerable skill in centralizing power through a cunning use of the appointment powers of the governor and through legislative maneuvering. He knows that power abhors a vacuum and that a diminution of Congress’s power will give the president a further opportunity to exercise power. A few Cabinet departments may be eliminated under Perry’s plan, but those agencies under the president’s direct control will have plenty of room to grow.

Any talk of cutting government employment may elicit shouts of glee from many on the right. But conservatives need to ask themselves whether it advances the cause of smaller government to reform the federal government so that the centralized executive branch has even more power.

Originally Posted at A Certain Enthusiasm.

Perhaps the greatest single threat to both conservatism in American life and the nation’s economic vitality is not Ivy League professors or Hollywood elites or a sinister “progressive” conspiracy but the economic decline of the middle class. Take away hope in the churning of the free market, and you push many citizens considerably closer to the state as a provider.

The turmoil of the markets in 2008 was merely the cataclysmic icing on top of the cake of a decade of lost ground for the bottom 90% of workers. Take that away, and an Obama victory would have been much less of a sure thing (and even such a victory would have been considerably moderated). If insurance premiums and coverage rates had been closer to those of 1993, Obamacare, the bette noire of conservative activists, would not have passed. The economic wasteland of the past few years has pushed more than a few public and private pension plans closer to the edge of insolvency.

The recent Congressional Budget Office report on incomes from 1979 to 2007 has depressing news for believers in egalitarian free-market capitalism. Since 1979, the after-taxes income of the bottom 80% of Americans as a share of the total national after-taxes income has dropped from 57% to 47%; every one of the first four quintiles has seen a drop in its share of the national income. Yet even the gains in economic strength for the top quintile have been unevenly shared. The 81st-99th-income-percentile range has seen its share of the national income stay the same. Meanwhile, the top 1% of earners have seen their share of the nation’s after-taxes income climb from 8% in 1979 to 17% in 2007. These numbers suggest that the profits of the national economy (broadly considered) have increasingly flowed to the top.

There are broader policy reasons that explain this change. For much of the past decade and beyond, the prevailing Republican (and, frankly, bipartisan elite) orthodoxy has been as follows: lower wages, lower prices, and an empowerment of capital over labor. The CBO numbers reflect this dynamic, as they show the share of income due to labor declining since 1979, while the share of income due to the combination of capital and business income increasing. The claim made continually on behalf of statist globalization over the past twenty years has been that lower prices on various goods through cheaper labor would reward the American consumer, and that the increase in spending power on tchotchkes would exceed the decline in wages due to outsourcing. Similar claims have been made on behalf of massive amounts of illegal immigration: poor workers in the shadows enrich Americans as a whole through providing a plentiful peon class to act as babysitters, home-builders, fast food workers, and other assorted “service” positions.

This decline in labor cost provides a de facto empowerment of capital: if you earn money from investing rather than collecting a paycheck, having cheaper resources of labor allows your dollar to go much further. The “ownership society” sought by President Bush attempted to leverage this dynamic. By making as many Americans investors as possible (especially through investing in the housing market), the Bush administration tried to place hundreds of millions of Americans in the position of the victorious investor class in order to compensate for the decline of the labor class.

However, there are noticeable shortcomings to this model. First of all, not all Americans can join the investor class, so a substantial number of Americans lose out in an investor-centric model. Moreover, housing, the investment vehicle favored by the Bush administration, is a dangerous institution on which to base an investor-centered economy: an individual house is nowhere near as fluid an investment vehicle as a stock portfolio, and the fact that most people need somewhere to live complicates the role of a house as an investment commodity. Since most people need to take on a mortgage in order to buy a house, using the house as the doorway to the investor market requires Americans to take on considerable amounts of debt, and the debt needed to keep the housing-investing game going will balloon (as the 2000s proved).

And the decrease in prices due to cheaper labor is not spread equally across all sectors of the economy. Those sectors least undermined by outsourcing and domestic and international low-skilled workers, such as health-care, have seen some of the biggest price increases over the past decade. Jeans at Walmart may be less, but your health insurance premiums have doubled. With wages stagnating or declining, health-care bills and others like them eat more and more into a worker’s paycheck. So the decline in wages is not fully compensated for by cheaper goods and services.

A final limit for the low wages=low prices model is that the consumer often does not feel the full price benefits of the decline in worker wages. Instead, the “savings” that many companies find through shipping work abroad or otherwise cutting labor costs are translated into bigger compensation packages for elite management and the investor class. While current “globalization” has witnessed the decline in wages for the middle and working classes, it has also seen the the pay of upper management (those who control large amounts of capital) increase. The recent history of American business is saturated with stories of companies that close down their American factories while giving upper management colossal paydays. So many of the presumed benefits of declining wages are accruing to an increasingly narrow band of the population.

With wages shrinking and the spigot of easy credit turned off, it’s no wonder that public demand has withered.

What might be slightly more interesting, though, is a movement among some factions on the right and left toward a policy reversal: using higher wages and not lower wages as a stimulant for economic growth. Under this model, rising incomes for working- and middle-class workers would increase consumer demand. Rather than the cost of jeans production going down, workers would have more money to spend on jeans—and housing and cars and medical care and foreign trips. Economic growth for the bottom 90% of wage-earners would in turn provide new opportunities for the top 10%. Things weren’t exactly bad for top-tax-bracketers during the egalitarian 1950s and 1960s or during the later part of the 1990s, when the income of a broader range of Americans increased in real terms (though income inequality increased in the 90s, as well). Rather than trickle-down economics, we would instead have foundation-up economics.

Nurturing this foundation in part depends upon increasing the skill level of the American workforce, so that workers can make the most of cutting-edge technologies. Education as driving future economic growth has perhaps acquired the somewhat dusty ring of tired dogma, but, like many things that may seem trite to the jaded, it has some truth to it. Reforming our immigration system, making new investments in fundamental research, and pushing back against social dysfunction (among other policies) would go a long way in the direction of improving the skills of America’s workforce and would likely improve the wages of many workers.

But mere training is no panacea. With all due respect to current education “reform” movements, people are not mere containers for educational inputs; they exist in vibrant, heterogeneous communities, where all do not all have the same aptitudes. America will not and probably cannot be a nation populated solely by Facebook founders and investment bankers and political pundits. It will have maids and clerks and factory technicians and farmers and truckers, too. We can and we should have an economic system that offers advancement to all productive enterprises of worth and merit.

(And make no mistake: the People’s Republic of China is witnessing great economic growth not because some of its students are doing well on international standardized math and science tests but because it has pursued an aggressive policy of protecting and developing Chinese industry. The decline of the US economy has less to do with the notion that it is graduating “insufficient” numbers of math and science majors and more to do with the fact that whole sectors of the economy have withered.)

Part of foundation-up economics also thus depends on protecting the livelihoods of so-called “lower-skill” workers (though, in reality, it does take considerable skill to build a house or run complex machinery or sundry other tasks). It may be true that the current statist flavor of globalization may increase inequality somewhat, but the extent of this inequality is in part due to other domestic policies. Our immigration and trade policies in particular have allowed those on the higher end of the ladder to leverage worker against worker in the pursuit of maximizing profits. Moreover, many of the gains for the wealthiest have been due not to the fair functioning of a free market but tothe manipulations of state power.

It is possible to realize an economy that combines the exuberance of the market with a sense of popular prosperity. However they may differ in their methods of reaching this goal, many Republican and Democratic presidents have aimed for it. For a number of years now, we have empowered capital through cheapening labor; now may be the time to increase the value of labor in order to find new opportunities for capital.

From a conservative perspective, an egalitarian economy, where all may have ready hope of living a comfortable life and of advancing economically, is far better than either an economy where the vast majority of workers need government checks to survive or an economy where the super-wealthy plunder the resources of the public and leave the populace as a whole to malinger. Some extremists of the left and of the right would push the economy in one direction or the other. Neither extreme is sustainable. A happy, prosperous workforce is not only the best environment for defending the free market; it is also one of the greatest promises of the free market.

Originally posted at A Certain Enthusiasm.

In the short term at least, it seems hard to deny that yesterday’s debate was good to Rick Perry. The leading un-Romney contender, Herman Cain, sank underneath withering attacks on his 9-9-9 plan; his inability to defend the details of this plan with anything other than assertions that his opponents are wrong reinforced impressions that he still has a lot of policy areas to brush up on.

And Perry’s deeply personal attacks on Mitt Romney helped bring the focus of the debate back on himself. These attacks may help keep Perry as the media takeaway from the event seems to be focusing on how much he’s hurt Romney—not on the Texas governor’s verbal slips or policy haziness.

All this may provide a boost for Perry and keep him in the race. But his attack on Romney about immigration may eventually raise even more problems for Perry. Via Byron York, here’s the substance of the exchange:

And Perry, for the first time in any GOP debate, rattled former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney. He did it by bringing up a 2007 charge that Romney hired illegal immigrants to do lawn work at his Massachusetts home. Jobs are the magnet for illegal immigrants, Perry said. “And Mitt, you lose all of your standing, from my perspective, because you hired illegals in your home and you knew about it for a year. And the idea that you stand here before us and talk about that you’re strong on immigration is on its face the height of hypocrisy.”

Romney tried to laugh it off and to deny the story. “I don’t think I’ve ever hired an illegal in my life,” he said. Romney tried to explain, but Perry kept pushing, leaving Romney protesting that Perry was ignoring the rules — just as Perry had planned.

“Rick, again, Rick, I’m speaking,” Romney said. “I’m speaking, I’m speaking, I’m speaking. You get 30 seconds. This is the way the rules work here…Anderson?”

By the time Romney appealed to CNN moderator Anderson Cooper for help, Romney seemed flustered, almost frantic. “Would you please wait?” he said to Perry. “Are you just going to keep talking?”

When Perry finally told Romney to “have at it,” Romney explained that he had hired a company to do lawn work and had no idea the company hired illegals until it was reported in the paper.

Perry has become known for his verbal imprecision in presidential debates, and his attack depends upon an indifference to the details of verbal meanings.

Romney “hired” illegal aliens, according to Perry, by paying a company that employed them to do a service. Under this definition of “employment,” anyone who goes to a restaurant that employs an illegal alien is also “employing” an illegal alien. A woman purchasing a candy bar from a supermarket with an illegal alien working at the deli counter is also “hiring” an illegal alien. By Perry’s definition of employment, he has probably “hired” countless illegal immigrants—at restaurants, stores, and so forth.

The point of Perry’s charge of hypocrisy was not to clarify the distinction between proclaimed position and actual practice but to shut down debate by casting an impossibly wide net of guilt. This appeal to hypocrisy to avoid a debate of policy principles is all too common in politics, especially at the federal level, so it’s perhaps no surprise to see Perry engaging in it here.

The point that primarily concerns American voters is not whether some individual candidate’s money ended up indirectly in the pocket of some illegal immigrant. The point that ought to concern us is whether a candidate thinks it is good to have the workforce be flooded with millions and millions of illegal workers. Romney’s record as governor and his rhetoric as president demonstrate that he thinks that might be a problem for this country. Rick Perry’s rhetoric and record—from his opposition to E-Verify to his support for major taxpayer subsidies for illegal aliens—suggests that he doesn’t think that’s such a big problem, if a problem at all. Both positions are understandable, but they are quite different, and we should not blur those important policy distinctions.

Ironically, Perry’s attack on Romney may leave Perry open to accusations of being a flip-flopper. Supposedly Romney hiring a company that (unknown to him, so he says) employs illegal aliens is to be a thing of outrage. But someone is also “heartless” if he doesn’t support giving tens of thousands of dollars of taxpayer subsidies to illegal aliens. It’s hard to square that circle. And such a Texas two-step seems more motivated by political opportunism than anything else.

One of Perry’s distinguishing characteristics has been his reputation as a straight-shooter. If Perry tarnishes that reputation by contradictory attacks on his political opponents, he may find his standing further erode in the polls.

Originally Posted at A Certain Enthusiasm.